Electric vehicles (EVs) are expected to be a major component of the smart grid. The rapid proliferation of EVs will introduce an unprecedented load on the existing electric grid due to the charging/discharging behavior of the EVs, thus motivating the need for novel approaches for routing EVs across the grid. In this paper, a novel gametheoretic framework for smart routing of EVs within the smart grid is proposed. The goal of this framework is to balance the electricity load across the grid while taking into account the traffic congestion and the waiting time at charging stations. The EV routing problem is formulated as a noncooperative game. For this game, it is shown that selfish behavior of EVs will result in a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with the price of anarchy upper bounded by the variance of the ground load induced by the residential, industrial, or commercial users. Moreover, the results are extended to capture the stochastic nature of induced ground load as well as the subjective behavior of the owners of EVs as captured by using notions from the behavioral framework of prospect theory. Simulation results provide new insights on more efficient energy pricing at charging stations and under more realistic grid conditions.
requires introducing an appropriate mechanism design scheme which incentivizes EVs to charge/discharge their batteries at those stations which have extra/shortage of energy, respectively.
As more EVs join the grid, the waiting time at charging stations along with actual road traffic will constitute a major challenge. Since EVs need to be charged more often than fossil-fueled vehicles [3] , charging stations may end up with long queues that can directly impact the comfort of EV owners. This challenge is exacerbated by the fact that EVs require considerably longer periods to charge or discharge, compared to conventional vehicles [4] .
To meet these challenges, there is a need for a systematic scheduling of EVs which not only takes into account the distribution of the electricity load but also reduces the traffic congestion and waiting time at charging stations.
A. Related Work
There have been several recent works that investigated the challenges of managing EVs in the smart grid [5] - [13] . In [5] , the authors propose a vehicle-to-aggregator interaction game and develop a pricing policy and design a mechanism to achieve optimal frequency regulation performance. The works in [6] and [7] propose truthful online auction mechanisms in which agents represent EV owners who bid for energy units and also time slots in which an EV is available for charging/discharging. Similarly, the work in [8] considers a consensus based online mechanism design for EV charging with pre-commitment.
A real-time traffic routing system based on an incentive compatible mechanism design has been considered in [12] . In this system a passenger first reports his maximum accepted travel time, and the mechanism then assigns a path that matches the passenger's preference given the current traffic conditions. In [9] and [11] , the authors propose a congestion game model to control the power demand at peak hours, by using dynamic pricing. A similar approach based on congestion games is proposed in [10] for EV charging. A survey on utilizing artificial intelligence techniques to manage EVs over the power grid can be found in [2] .
Meanwhile, there is a rich literature on routing games where the traffic congestion is selfishly controlled by vehicle owners who seek to minimize their travel costs [14] - [18] . Depending on whether the traffic flow can be divided among different paths one can distinguish unsplitable and splitable routing games [17] . Moreover, whether each user's contribution to the overall traffic is negligible or not one can distinguish non-atomic and atomic routing games [14] . In this regard, one of the widely used metrics in the literature which measures efficiency and the extent to which a system degrades due to selfish behavior of its agents is the price of anarchy (PoA) [15] . It has been shown in [16] that, for a linear latency function, the PoA of a nonatomic routing game is exactly 4 3 . This result has been extended later in [17] to splittable routing game with a slightly different bound on the PoA. Similarly, the authors in [18] have studied the PoA of selfish load balancing in atomic congestion games. Moreover, the price of anarchy of noncooperative demand-response in smart grids with flexible loads/EVs has been studied in [19] and [20] . In [21] , the problem of smart routing was considered, however, this work does not study the existence or other properties of the equilibrium, nor does establish any results on prospect theory.
While the earlier literature provides important analytic results for managing EVs in the grid, these works mainly focus on one aspect of smart grid, (e.g., reducing the peak hour demand) without taking into account other important factors such as traffic congestion or waiting time at charging stations which are also crucial in affecting EVs' decisions. Moreover, there is strong evidence [22] that real-world, human decision makers do not make decisions based on expected values of outcomes, but rather based on their perception on the potential value of losses and gains associated with an outcome. Since EVs are owned and operated by humans, the subjective perceptions and decisions of these human owners can substantially affect the grid outcomes. This makes prospect theory (PT) [22] a powerful framework that allows modeling real-life human choices, a natural choice for modeling EVs' decision making in smart grids under real behavioral considerations. Applications of PT for energy management by modifying consumers electricity demands have been addressed earlier in [23] and [24] . However, these works do not capture the real-life decision making processes involved in the management of EVs in the smart grid.
B. Contributions
To address the aforementioned challenges, the main contribution of this paper is to develop a comprehensive framework for EV management in smart grids which takes into account the traffic congestion costs, the electricity price and availability, the distributed nature of the system, and the subjective perceptions of the EV owners. Our work differs from prior art in several aspects: 1) It models the interactions between EV using a routing game [14] , by taking into account the traffic congestion costs, 2) Factors in the waiting time of EVs at charging stations, 3) Introduces an energy pricing scheme to balance the EV load across the grid, and 4) Incorporates real-life decision behavior of EVs under uncertain energy availability by using PT and studies its deviations from conventional classical game theory (CGT). Our work is motivated by the fact that EVs can be viewed as dynamic storage devices which can move around the grid and balance the load across it. This mandates careful grid designs (e.g., pricing electricity properly at charging stations) that can align the energy needs of selfish EVs with those of the smart grid.
In the studied model, we consider a set of EVs that are traveling from an origin to a destination. Each EV can stop at one of the charging stations along its origin-destination path to charge/discharge its battery. Moreover, each EV can decide on the amount of energy to charge/discharge at that station. Here, the energy price charged at each station for buying or selling depends on the total energy demand at that station as well as the ground load which is induced by other grid components such as residential or industrial users. Therefore, each EV makes a decision by choosing a route, a charging station along that route to join, and the amount of energy to charge/discharge. We formulate the interactions between EVs as a noncooperative game in which each EV seeks to minimize the tradeoff between travel time and energy price. We show that such a game admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) and we show that the PoA of this NE is upper bounded by the ratio of the variance of the ground load to the total number of EVs in the grid. Hence, for a large number of EVs, although each EV selfishly and independently minimizes its own cost, the social cost of all EVs will still be close to its optimal value, i.e., when a central grid authority optimally manages all the EVs. Furthermore, we show that any Nash equilibrium achieved as a result of the EVs' interactions will indeed improve the load balancing across the grid. We then take into account the uncertainty of the ground load and provide a bound on the number of EVs which guarantees a low PoA with high probability. In particular, we extend our model by incorporating the subjective behavior of EVs and study its deviations from CGT. 1 Our simulation results provide new insights on energy pricing at different stations in order to keep the overall performance of the grid, which is measured in terms of the social cost, close to its optimal under more realistic scenarios.
C. Organization and Notations
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce our system model. In Section III, we analyze the equilibrium, price of anarchy, and load balancement. We extend our results to a stochastic setting with PT in Section IV. Simulation results are given in Section V, and conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
Notations: A path (route) P i in a directed graph G := (V, E) from s i ∈ V, to t i ∈ V, is a collection of edges which are sequentially connected together with a starting vertex s i , and an ending vertex t i . For a vector v, we let v i be its ith component. We denote all but the ith component of a vector v by
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a traffic network modeled as a directed graph G = (V, E), where each edge e ∈ E represents a road.
This network has a total of n EVs (players) in the set N . We let n e ∈ Z ≥0 be the total number of EVs on road e.
We denote the level of battery charge of vehicle i by
, where b min and b max denote, respectively, the minimum level of battery charge for an EV to operate, and the maximum capacity of an EV battery (we always have 0 < b min < b max ). In this network, we have a total of m charging stations in the set M that are located over possibly different roads of the network. Each charging station j ∈ M can serve its EVs with a rate of σ j > 0.
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We denote the set of all EVs associated to station j by Q j . We let g j ∈ R be the the ground electricity load at station j. This load is induced by grid components other than EVs such as residential, industrial, or commercial users. Here, g j > 0 means that station j has extra energy to sell, while g j < 0 indicates a shortage of energy.
We assume that each EV wants to go from its current location s i ∈ V to its destination t i ∈ V over a path (route) P i . During this route, it can choose to charge/discharge its battery by some amount
some intermediate station q i ∈ M along that route. Here, l i > 0 means that EV i charges its battery by l i units of energy, while l i < 0 means it discharges its battery. Therefore, we can denote the action of an EV (player) i by a i := (P i , q i , l i ), where P i is the path chosen by player i from its source to its destination, q i is the selected charging station along P i , and l i is the amount of electricity that player i decides to charge or discharge at station q i (Figure 1 ). Finally, denoting the actions of all the players by (a i , a −i ), we can define the cost of EV i as:
where c e (·) is a latency function that captures the traffic congestion as a function of the total number of EVs over road e ∈ E, and f (·) is a general energy pricing function determined by the power company. In (1), the first term The traffic load on each road is captured by the thickness of that edge (the thicker an edge, the more traffic on that road). The blue bar next to each station shows that that station has extra energy while the red bar shows the shortage level of electricity on that station. Given the current state of the network, it seems most reasonable for EV i to choose the route P i and stop by station q i to charge l i energy units.
captures the waiting cost of EV i due to traffic congestion, the second term is the waiting cost for joining station q i which is proportional to the number of vehicles at station q i , and the third term is the risk of having an empty battery which grows quickly as the battery level decreases. Finally, the last term is the energy expense (income)
for choosing to charge (discharge) l i units of electricity at station q i . In this formulation, the energy price for EV i equals to its marginal energy contribution to station q i . Note that the last term in (1) can also be negative, which means that EV i can be paid by the system depending on the aggregate load of EVs and ground energy in station q i .
For instance, if the aggregate ground and EVs' load at station q i is very negative (i.e., there is a substantial shortage of energy in that station), then EV i can sell its battery charge at a very high price at station q i . This incentivizes EVs who have extra energy in their batteries to join station q i and discharge their batteries thus balancing the load at that station.
In fact, one can implement the EV game as a repeated game between EV owners who will, daily, travel the distance between their home (origin) to their work (destination). In particular, at certain peak hours of the day (e.g., 9 am or 5 pm), one may assume that all the drivers are available in the system which subsequently yields the highest traffic congestion or load disturbance in the grid. The information that the EVs require to compute their optimal strategies can be broadcast using a data platform such as a radio station or they can directly be sent to the GPS devices of the EVs using satellite signals. Before starting the trip, the most updated information on the entire network (e.g., road congestion or charging station loads) will be available at each EV's GPS device. Once a driver enters its source-destination to the GPS, it automatically receives its optimal strategy (i.e., what roads to take or which stations to join) that will be sent immediately by the GPS device to the data station. Then, the data station updates its information which will be again available to all the EVs' GPS devices. Next, we provide two examples for the choice of latency and pricing functions.
Example 1. Given a road e ∈ E, let b e be the length of that road. Then, a natural choice for the latency function is the linear latency function given by c e (x) = a e x + b e . This means that the travel time of an EV that chooses road e depends on the length of that road and linearly increases in terms of the number of other vehicles on that road. of the newly joined EV in that station (x > 0 for charging and x < 0 for discharging). As it can be seen, the slope of price increase for additional charge at the left station (which has shortage of energy) is very sharp, hence disincentivizing EVs to join that station and charge their batteries. Moreover, at the same station, if the EVs decide to discharge their batteries, the station is willing to buy their energy in a reasonably good price. However, for the right station (which has extra energy), the marginal price for charging is considerably reduced in order to incentivize more EVs to join that station and charge their batteries. On the other hand, the station in the right figure buys energy from the EVs at a low price, which in turn can disincentivize EVs to discharge their batteries at that station.
As it can be seen from the definition of EVs' cost functions (1), the incurred cost by an EV depends not only its own action, but also on the other EVs' decisions. This naturally defines a noncooperative game [25] among the EVs having the following key components: A set N of EVs (players). Each player i ∈ N has an action set
where P i is the set of all paths between s i to t i , and S i is the set of all stations along the chosen path by player i. Each player i ∈ N takes an action a i ∈ A i and incurs a cost
given by (1) . In this game, each EV in the grid seeks to select an action which minimizes its own cost, as we study next.
III. ANALYSIS OF EQUILIBRIUM AND POA
Our first goal is to analyze whether the proposed game will yield a stable outcome, as captured by the notion of a Nash equilibrium:
is called a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the EVs' interaction game
Next, we show that the EVs interaction game admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, meaning that although each EV aims to minimize its own cost, but they collectively will converge to a stable outcome where every EV is satisfied as long as others do not deviate.
Theorem 1. The selfish EV interaction game admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A-A.
Theorem 1 shows that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists despite the fact that the actions of the players can take both discrete and continuous quantities or they can be highly coupled (e.g. choosing what station to join
highly depends on what route to choose). Even though this theorem does not characterize uniqueness or efficiency of the equilibrium, as will be shown later in this section for a large number of EVs, all the equilibrium points will be almost equally efficient in terms of the social cost.
Remark 1. As shown in Appendix A-A, the EVs game is a potential game and, thus, every unilateral move by an EV that aims at reducing its cost will bring the entire game one step closer to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, if EVs only use their GPS devices on their daily trips, an equilibrium will be reached after a sufficiently
Next, we analyze the price of anarchy of the EVs' game which is an important measure to capture how much the selfish behavior of the EVs can influence the overall optimality of the grid. Here, optimality is measured in terms of EVs' social cost assuming that a network authority with complete information manages the EVs and seeks to minimize their overall cost. In fact, since EVs are selfish entities whose actions cannot be centrally controlled, modeling EVs' interactions as a game that yields a small PoA is very important. Interestingly, the following theorem shows that for linear latency and quadratic energy pricing, the PoA is bounded above by the averaged sum of the squared ground loads.
Theorem 2. For a linear latency function c e (x) = a e x + b e , and quadratic energy pricing function f (x) = x 2 , we
), where n is number of EVs, m is the number of stations, and g j is the ground load in station j.
Proof. See Appendix A-B.
As a result of Theorem 2, if there are many EVs in the grid (i.e., n is large), although every EV minimizes its own cost, the entire grid will still operate very close to its optimal state with the minimum social cost and within only a small constant factor. This allows us to align the selfish EVs' needs with those of the grid and achieve nearly the same optimal social cost when a central grid authority dictates decisions to EVs. It is worth noting that Theorem 2 does not imply that, for a large number of EVs, the players' costs are less (clearly, for higher number of EVs, the traffic congestion and waiting time at charging stations is high). However, it shows that, for a large number of EVs, there is no way to substantially reduce the aggregate cost of all the EVs more than what it is already achieved at a Nash equilibrium.
In fact, a similar metric to the PoA which measures the efficiency of the game is known as the price of stability (PoS) which compares the social cost of the "best" NE over the optimal cost, i.e., P oS =
Ci(a) . If we consider the PoS of the game, we can obtain a tighter bound on system optimality: Theorem 3. For the linear latency and quadratic pricing function, the PoS of the EVs' interaction game is upper
, where C * is the minimum social cost, i.e., C * = min a i C i (a).
Proof. See Appendix A-D.
Typically, in real grids one can assume that the minimum social cost is larger than the number of vehicles C * > n.
This simply holds if each player incurs a unit cost in the system (for example we charge each EV $1 as a toll of using roads or other grid facilities), in which case the PoS is upper bounded by P oS
). Next, we show that any Nash equilibrium achieved by the EVs will indeed improve the load balance in the grid.
For this purpose, we can capture the initial load imbalance of the grid by the variance of the initial ground loads
Therefore, we can express the improvement of load balancing at a Nash equilibrium by
2 denotes the variance of the load at that specific Nash equilibrium. Then:
For the quadratic pricing function, assume that all the EVs have the same initial battery level
3 Then, for any arbitrary Nash equilibrium, we have:
where
and |Q j | denotes the number of EVs at station j at that Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A-E.
As a result of Theorem 4, the players charging/discharging strategies at a Nash equilibrium always improves the load balance in the grid. In particular, this improvement is more pronounced when the initial ground load is very unbalanced. In fact, in practice, such load balancing can be very effective as we will see through a numerical example in Section V. Next, we consider the EVs' interaction game under a more realistic grid scenario with uncertain ground load environment and we study the effect of EVs' behavioral decisions on the overall performance of the smart grid.
], then g j is already very small and close to 0 which eliminates the necessity of load balancing in station j.
IV. STOCHASTIC GROUND LOAD WITH PROSPECT EVS
Next, we assume that the induced ground load at each station g j , j ∈ M, which is due to industrial, residential, or commercial users is a random variable with some unknown distribution G j . Indeed, in a smart grid, a good portion of the energy generated and injected to the grid will stem from renewable resources such as wind turbines or solar panels. Since the amount of such renewable energy highly depends on the environment, such as weather conditions, which is a stochastic phenomenon, the induced renewable energy also changes stochastically at various locations [26] . On the other hand, the energy consumption of residential or industrial users normally follows certain stochastic patterns during specific time slots of a day (e.g., more consumption during early evening hours and less after midnight). Since the ground loads at different stations are mainly influenced by the grid components within their vicinity, for sufficiently distant stations, we can simply assume that the induced ground loads are stochastically independent. Under this independency assumption, we study the optimality of the EVs game under stochastic ground load. Next, we provide an estimate for the number of EVs needed to guarantee a low PoA with high probability. 1) , with probability at least 1 − .
Theorem 5. Consider independent ground loads
Proof. See Appendix A-F.
As it was proposed in [27] , the grid authority can use EVs to balance the load on the grid by charging when demand is low and selling power back to the grid (discharging) when demand is high. To this end, Theorem 5 provides an estimate on the required number of EVs to be added into the network in order to keep the grid performance in terms of the social cost close to its optimal.
A. Prospect-Theoretic Analysis of the EVs' Game
Now, we take into account the subjective behavior of EV owners under uncertain energy availability. In this regard, there is a strong evidence [22] that, in the real-world, human decision makers do not make decisions based on expected values of outcomes evaluated by actual probabilities, but rather based on their perception on the potential value of losses and gains associated with an outcome. Indeed, using PT, the authors in [22] showed that human individuals such as EV owners, will often overestimate low probability outcomes and underestimate high probability outcomes. This phenomenon, known as weighting effect in PT, reflects the fact that EV owners usually have subjective views on uncertain outcomes such as energy availabiity at the charging stations. Moreover, there is an evidence that in reality humans perceive and frame their losses or gains with respect to a reference point using their own, individual and subjective value function. As an example, risk averse EV owners consider any energy price higher than that when the grid operated in its balanced condition as a loss and overestimate it. This is known as framing effect in PT which differs from conventional CGT that assumes players are rational agents who are indifferent to the reference point with respect to which their losses or gains are evaluated. 
Two of the widely used weighting and framing functions in the PT literature are known as Prelec weighting function and Tversky valuation function defined by [28] , [29] ,
where 0 < c ≤ 1 is a constant denoting the distortion between subjective and objective probability, and c 1 , c 2 , c 3 > 0 are constants denoting the degree of loss aversion. To formulate the EVs' interaction game using PT, we assume that the ground load at station j follows a discrete distribution G j with zero mean (i.e., E[G j ] = 0, j ∈ M), and a probability mass function h j (·). Moreover, we assume that each EV i evaluates its gain or loss with respect to a reference point
, which is the price that EV i expects to receive when the ground load is balanced at its mean 0. In other words, R i is the price that EV i expects to pay in station q i given that this station operates in its complete balanced condition, and anything above or below this reference price is considered as loss or gain for that vehicle. Using this reference point, when the ground load at station q i equals z, the gain/loss of EV i equals to δ i (z, a) :
As a result, the perceived prospect cost by EV i is given by
Here, each EV i aims to minimize its own prospect cost given by (4) by choosing an appropriate action a i . The following theorem shows that despite extra nonlinearity of the weighting and framing effects in the players' cost functions, the EVs' game under PT still admits a pure NE.
Theorem 6. For the quadratic pricing f (x) = x 2 , the EVs' game under PT admits a pure-strategy NE. In particular, the best response dynamics converge to one of such NE points.
Proof. See Appendix A-G.
Here, we should mention that if we use different pricing functions or assume other sources of uncertainty such as randomness in players actions, then the EVs' game under PT will not necessarily admit a pure-strategy NE.
In that case, one may need to analyze the EVs' game under its mixed-strategy NE points which is guaranteed to exist for finite games. In fact, one of the challenges of analyzing EVs' game under PT is the extra nonlinearities in the players' cost functions which stem from weighting and framing effects. This eliminates the possibility of finding explicit bounds for PoA under PT. For instance, as opposed to CGT, the PoA of the game with prospect cost functions will now depend on the specific choice of weighting and framing functions. In the next section, we provide some numerical results to study the PoA of the EVs' game under both CGT and PT and for different pricing functions. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
For our simulations, we consider the linear latency function of the form c e (x) = 5x + 3 for all the roads e, and quadratic pricing functions f (x) = x 2 for the stations. We choose the traffic network to be as in Figure 4 with 5 directed roads, and 3 charging stations. We assume i.i.d Gaussian distributions G j ∼ N (0, 10) for the ground load at different stations. Also, for simplicity, we assume that all the EVs are identical with b max = 5, b min = 0.1, and b i = 3, ∀i, who want to travel from the origin s to the destination t.
A. PoA under Classical Game Theory
In Figure 4 , we illustrate how the PoA under CGT changes as more EVs join the grid. Here, we let the number of EVs increase from n = 1 to n = 10, and compute the maximum social cost over all pure-strategy NE points divided by the minimum (optimal) social cost. Clearly, when n = 1, there is no game and the two concepts of NE and optimal solution coincide, i.e., P oA = 1. Moreover, when n = 2, since the EVs can take completely disjoint routes, then, there is not much overlap between their strategies which renders the selfish behavior and optimal solution close to each other. However, for n = 3, at least two of the EVs must take overlapping paths which results in a larger deviation between selfish and optimal costs, i.e., larger PoA. However, starting from n = 3, adding more
EVs monotonically reduces the PoA as was expected by Theorem 2. As a result, for larger number of EVs (which is the case in the future smart grids) the distributed nature of smart grid or the selfish behavior of EVs do not affect the ultimate optimality of the grid, measured in terms of social cost. Table I lists the NE strategies, the optimal cost, and the highest NE social cost for n = 9 vehicles. As an example the NE strategy for player 1 is to take the route P 2 = (e 2 , e 5 ), join station 3, and charge its battery by l 1 = 0.79 energy units. In this table, the initial realized random ground loads at stations Q 1 , Q 2 , and Q 3 are g 1 = 0.937,
.223, and g 3 = 3.061, respectively. Therefore, the initial load imbalance equals V 0 = 136.116, while the ground loads at the equilibrium at these stations are given by g = 0.098. As a result, the load imbalance at this Nash equilibrium equals V N E = 1.241 which is substantially less than the initial load imbalance V 0 = 136.116.
In fact, one of the important features of our model is that, in general, assigning the EVs optimally to balance the load in a centralized manner is computationally very expensive as it requires solving a mixed nonlinear integer program to find the optimal paths, charging stations, and the charge/discharge energy units. In fact, one can show TABLE I: Pure NE for n = 9 EVs, three paths P 1 = (e 1 , e 4 ), P 2 = (e 2 , e 5 ), P 3 = (e 2 , e 3 , e 4 ), and three stations Q 1 , Q 2 , and Q 3 . that the computational complexity of solving such an optimization problem exponentially grows in terms of the number of EVs. However, Theorem 2 and Figure 4 suggest that for large number of EVs the optimal assignment can be approximated within a small constant factor by a solution where each EV selfishly minimizes its own cost.
This can be done quite efficiently as now each EV minimizes its cost over only its own strategies.
B. PoA under Prospect Theory
Now, we evaluate the effect of PT on the PoA. We set all the parameters as in the case of CGT. We also assume that all the EVs have the same weighting and valuation functions given by (3) with c = c 1 = 0.5, c 2 = c 3 = 2. To this end, as we increase the number of EVs from n = 1 to n = 6, we compute PoA for mixed-strategy NE points under exponential pricing and pure-strategy NE points under quadratic pricing. Figure 5 shows that, for quadratic pricing, similar to the CGT the PoA decreases when there are more EVs in the grid. On the other, for exponential pricing, the PoA monotonically increases for higher number of EVs. This is because exponential pricing magnifies the uncertainty of the ground load. This increases the effect of nonlinear term induced by PT in the EVs' cost functions, which results in more deviation from CGT. Moreover, exponential pricing is very sensitive to small load changes at the charging stations. Therefore, minimizing the social costs with only partial information (which is the case of selfish routing in NE) and full information (which is the case for optimal routing) can result in substantially different outcomes. However, for fewer number of EVs, the PoA of the exponential pricing outperforms the quadratic pricing. This suggests that, under PT and fewer number of EVs, exponential pricing is preferred over quadratic pricing, however for larger number of vehicles the quadratic pricing performs better under realistic grid settings.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the interaction of selfish electric vehicles in smart grids. We have formulated a noncooperative game between the EVs and, then, we have shown that the game admits a pure-strategy NE. Then, we have shown that the PoA of the game is bounded above by the "variance" of the ground load divided by the total number of vehicles. This in turn implied that for large number of EVs in the grid, the entire system operates very close to its optimal condition with the minimum social cost, despite the fact that EVs are selfish identities.
In particular, we have obtained a tighter upper bound for the PoS of the EVs' interaction game, and showed that for any achieved equilibrium indeed improves the load balancing across the grid. We have extended our results to the case where the ground load is stochastic and incorporated the subjective behavior of EVs using PT into our model. Simulation results showed that, under realistic grid scenarios with subjective EVs, quadratic pricing is more suitable for large number of EVs, while for fewer EVs, exponential pricing would be a better choice.
APPENDIX A

A. Proof of Theorem 1
Let Φ(·) be a potential function defined by
We will show that for any two actions a i = (P i , q i , l i ) and
Next we consider the change in the potential function due to an action change of player i. We can write:
Finally, noting that Φ(a i ,
, and by substituting (7) into this relation, we obtain exactly the same expression as in (6) . This shows that Φ(·) is an exact potential function for the game, and hence, it admits a pure-strategy NE [30] .
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Denote an arbitrary but fixed NE profile by
, and the optimal action profile which minimizes the sum of the costs
. Moreover, let us denote the cost of this NE and the optimal cost by N E, and OP T , respectively, i.e., N E :
Summing all the above inequalities for i ∈ [n] we obtain
Next we upper bound each of the three summands in (8) . To this end, let OP T 1 and N E 1 denote the traffic congestion costs for the optimal solution and the NE, respectively. i.e.,
c e (n e ) = e∈E n e c e (n e ) = e∈E n e (a e n e +b e ).
where n e and n * e are the number of vehicles on edge e ∈ E induced by the Nash equilibrium and the optimal solution. Note that OP T 1 and N E 1 are not the equilibrium and optimal costs if we restrict our utility functions into the first term only, and they are only a cost portion that vehicles incur in Nash equilibrium and optimal allocation due to the traffic congestion. To find a bound for the first sum in (8) we use a similar method as in [17, = N E 1 × OP T 1 + OP T 1 .
Next, let us define the total delay costs in all the charge stations in the optimal allocation and the equilibrium by OP T 2 and N E 2 , respectively. We have
To upper bound the second term in (8) based on OP T 2 and N E 2 , we can write
where the first equality follows by the fact that exactly |Q * j | of the players in the second summand of (8) will change their station from some q i to j, and the second inequality is due to the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Finally, we proceed to bound the last summand in (8) . For this purpose, let us define L j := k∈Qj l k and L * j := k∈Q * j l * k be the aggregate load induced by Nash equilibrium and optimal solution in station j. We can write 
Using the same procedure for Nash equilibrium we obtain
where ∆ := m j=1 g 2 j + 2(ηn + N E 3 ). Now, to bound the third term in (8), we can write
where γ := , and the second last inequality is due to (13) and (14) . Replacing (15), (11) , and (10) into (8) we obtain
where the first inequality holds because for any four positive numbers a 1 , a 2 , a 3 and a 4 we have
. Moreover, the last inequality stems from the fact that N E 3 ≤ N E, and OP T 3 ≤ OP T .
Dividing both sides of (16) by OP T and setting x = N E OP T and assuming that OP T ≥ n (this will happen if we charge each player $1 for using the network), we get . Then if x satisfies
we must have x ≤ 3 + 8b 
Now since p 2 + 4q + 4
2 , replacing this into (18) we get x ≤ p 2 + 2q + γ n . Replacing the expressions for p, q, and γ into this relation and simplifying we obtain
Replacing the identity 
D. Proof of Theorem 3
To bound the PoS, we use the potential function method as in [31, Theorem 19.13 ] to show that the social cost C(a) := i C i (a) has pretty much the same structure as the potential function Φ(a). To do so, by using the linear latency function c e (x) = a e x + b e , and the quadratic energy pricing f (x) = x 2 in the potential function (5), we get Φ(a) = 1 2 e a e n 2 e + (a e + 2b e )n e + m j=1
On the other hand, the social cost equals C(a) = 
Comparing (20) and (21), we can write Now letâ be the NE which minimizes the potential function Φ(·), and a * be the optimal action profile, i.e., C(a * ) = C * . We have, 
E. Proof of Theorem 4
Consider an arbitrary but fixed station j. Note that for any arbitrary Nash equilibrium {(P i , q i , l i )} i∈N , the load components of all the players who join station j, i.e., {l i : i ∈ Q j } must form a Nash equilibrium if the players' costs are restricted to only the load portion of their costs. In other words, for every i ∈ Q j , if we consider |Q j | players with cost functionŝ
then, {l i : i ∈ Q j } must be a Nash equilibrium for this restricted game. 4 Since, for every i, k ∈ Q j we have ∂ ∂ 2 l iĈ i = 2 + 1 (b+l i ) 2 , and ∂ ∂l i ∂l kĈ i = 2, the restricted game with cost functions (22) is diagonally strictly convex and admits a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium [32, Theorem 2] , given by {l i : i ∈ Q j }. In addition, since by assumption b i = b, ∀i, all the players have the same cost function. As a result the restricted game is a symmetric convex game which means that its unique equilibrium is symmetric. Thus l i = l, ∀i ∈ Q j , for some l ∈ [b min − b, b max − b]. As a result, the load costs for all the players i ∈ Q j at the Nash equilibrium are the same and equal tô
In particular, the equilibrium load l must be the unique minimizer of (23) 
where the first inequality is by the upper bound on g j , and the second inequality is because b min − b ≤ 0.
Case II: If g j ≥ (2|Q j | − 1)(b max − b) + 1 2bmax , we have
where the first inequality is by the lower bound on g j . , which is the unique root of the derivative of (23), and hence it satisfies l = 1 2|Qj |−1 (g j + 1 2(b+l) ). Now we can write
Here, one can easily see that, for g j ≥ 1 b+l or g j ≤ −1 b+l , the above quadratic expression inside the brackets is always less than −g 2 j . Therefore, in this case we have
